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Fundamental Rights Regimes
in the European Union: Contouring
Their Spheres
Ferdinand Wollenschläger
1 Introduction
Various fundamental rights regimes are in operation within the European Union
(EU), and frequently overlap: national regimes, and in states which have a federal
system even sub-national fundamental rights, the EU’s fundamental rights and the
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). This raises the issue of how to
determine their respective scope of application, which is not only a substantive
question, but also a procedural one since different courts are entrusted with their
protection, notably the European Court of Justice (ECJ), the European Court of
Human Rights (ECtHR), and national constitutional courts. It is also a sensitive and
controversial question since conflicts of jurisdictions and institutions may and do
arise: From a top-down perspective, and this has been conﬁrmed by the experience
in states which have a federal system such as the US or Germany, a far-reaching
application of central fundamental rights catalogues may entail a signiﬁcant uni-
tarisation; and conversely, from a bottom-up perspective, applying decentral
guarantees to EU action may endanger its uniform application.
Against this background, the ﬁrst part of the paper (Sect. 2) explores the rele-
vance of national fundamental rights for EU action. In this respect, a recent ruling
of the German Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court—BVerfG)
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on the European Arrest Warrant (of 15 December 2015) has shown that constitu-
tional reservations (such as the famous “Solange” jurisprudence) are not only of
theoretical, but also of practical relevance. The second part of the paper (Sect. 3)
addresses the controversial question of the degree to which EU Member States are
bound by EU fundamental rights, which in turn have ﬁnally been codiﬁed with the
Treaty of Lisbon in 2009. Here, a potentially broad approach of the ECJ (notably
Fransson case) contrasts with a somewhat restrictive position taken up by national
constitutional courts.
2 Delimitation of National and EU Fundamental Rights
with Regard to EU Action
While it is clear that EU action is comprehensively bound by EU fundamental rights
(cf. only Art. 51 para. 1 CFR),1 the applicability of national fundamental rights to
EU action remains controversial.2 There is however a need to distinguish between
EU (Sect. 2.1) and national (Sect. 2.2) perspectives in this respect. This notwith-
standing, an approximation between these two perspectives may be observed
(Sect. 2.3).
2.1 The EU Law Perspective
Based on its understanding of EU law as an autonomous legal order, the ECJ rejects
the (direct) applicability of national fundamental rights to EU action. The ECJ
already held in its landmark ruling Costa/E.N.E.L. of 15 July 1964 “that the law
stemming from the Treaty, an independent source of law, could not, because of its
special and original nature, be overridden by domestic legal provisions, however
framed, without being deprived of its character as Community law and without the
legal basis of the Community itself being called into question.”3 In Internationale
Handelsgesellschaft, a ruling handed down on 17 December 1970, the Court
concretised this ﬁnding with regard to the protection of fundamental rights:
Recourse to the legal rules or concepts of national law in order to judge the validity of
measures adopted by the institutions of the Community would have an adverse effect on the
uniformity and efﬁcacy of Community law. The validity of such measures can only be
judged in the light of Community law. In fact, the law stemming from the Treaty, an
independent source of law, cannot because of its very nature be overridden by rules of
national law, however framed, without being deprived of its character as Community law
1Cf. in more detail, Wollenschläger (2014a), paras 56 ff.
2This section is based on Wollenschläger (2014a), paras 12 ff.
3ECJ, Case 6/64, Costa/E.N.E.L., [1964] ECR 587, 594.
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and without the legal basis of the Community itself being called in question. Therefore the
validity of a Community measure or its effect within a Member State cannot be affected by
allegations that it runs counter to either fundamental rights as formulated by the constitution
of that State or the principles of a national constitutional structure.4
2.2 The National Constitutional Law Perspective
2.2.1 Constitutional Conditions for European Integration
There is however a differing national perspective on this issue. For, notwithstanding
diverging approaches, national legal orders do not acknowledge the unconditional
primacy of EU law and make primacy notably dependent on an adequate protection
of fundamental rights.5 To take the German example, according to the well-known
4ECJ, Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, [1970] ECR 1125, para 3 – while empha-
sising the role of national constitutional law as source of inspiration for EU fundamental rights,
though (para 4). Cf. more recently ECJ, Case C-409/06, Winner Wetten GmbH, [2010] ECR
I-8015, para 61; Case C-399/11, Melloni, EU:C:2013:107, para 59.
5See only for Denmark: Højesteret, 6 April 1998 – I 361/1997 (Maastricht), Nr. 9.2 (EuGRZ 1999,
49); France: Conseil Const., 20 December 2007 – 2007-560 DC (Lissabon), Nr. 9: “lorsque des
engagements… contiennent une clause contraire à la Constitution, remettent en cause les droits et
libertés constitutionnellement garantis ou portent atteinte aux conditions essentielles d’exercice de
la souveraineté nationale, l’autorisation de les ratiﬁer appelle une révision constitutionnelle”; Art.
28 III Constitution of Greece; Italy: Corte Cost. (“Controlimiti-doctrine”), 27 December 1973 –
183/1973 (Frontini), Nr. 9 (EuGRZ 1975, 311); 5 June 1984 – 170/1984 (Granital), Nr. 7 (EuGRZ
1985, 98); 13 April 1989 – 232/1989 (Fragd); 18 April 1991 – 168/1991 (Giampaoli), Nr. 4:
“l‘ordinamento statale non si apre incondizionatamente alla normazione comunitaria giacché in
ogni caso vige il limite del rispetto dei principi fondamentali del nostro ordinamento costituzionale
e dei diritti inalienabili della persona umana, con conseguente sindacabilità, sotto tale proﬁlo, della
legge di esecuzione del Trattato”; Poland: Tryb. Konst., 24 November 2010 – K 32/09 (Lissabon),
III.2.1 (EuGRZ 2012, 172): Protection of the “constitutional identity”, notably “decisions speci-
fying the fundamental principles of the Constitution and decisions concerning the rights of the
individual which determine the identity of the state, including, in particular, the requirement of
protection of human dignity and constitutional rights, the principle of statehood, the principle of
democratic governance, the principle of a state ruled by law, the principle of social justice, the
principle of subsidiarity, as well as the requirement of ensuring better implementation of consti-
tutional values and the prohibition to confer the power to amend the Constitution and the com-
petence to determine competences”; Art. 3 a Constitution of Slovenia: “respect for human rights
and fundamental freedoms, democracy and the principles of the rule of law”; Spain: Trib. Const.,
13 December 2004 – DTC 1/2004 (Constitutional Treaty), II.2. : “respeto de la soberanía del
Estado, de nuestras estructuras constitucionales básicas y del sistema valores y principios fun-
damentales consagrados en nuestra Constitución, en el que los derechos fundamentales adquieren
sustantividad propia” (EuR 2005, 339); afﬁrmed in Trib. Const., 13 February 2014 – DTC
26/2014, II.3: “Notwithstanding, the Constitutional Court also upheld that ‘In the unlikely case
where, in the ulterior dynamics of the legislation of the European Union, said law is considered
irreconcilable with the Spanish Constitution, without the hypothetical excesses of the European
legislation with regard to the European Constitution itself being remedied by the ordinary channels
set forth therein, in a ﬁnal instance, the conservation of the sovereignty of the Spanish people and
the given supremacy of the Constitution could lead this Court to approach the problems which, in
such a case, would arise. Under current circumstances, said problems are considered inexistent
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Solange jurisprudence of the BVerfG, ﬁrst formulated in 1974, the primacy of EU
law depends on a standard of fundamental rights protection at EU level, which must
be in essence comparable to the indispensable requirements of the Basic Law.6
Hence, the BVerfG reserves the right to measure EU action against fundamental
rights standards enshrined in the Basic Law. In view of the openness of the Basic
Law towards European integration (cf. the preamble and the goal of European
integration formulated in Art. 23 GG), however, the BVerfG does not exercise this
control as long as such a standard is secured at EU level, notably by the ECJ. The
BVerfG has acknowledged since the Solange II ruling of 22 October 1986 that this
is the case.7 These boundaries on European integration developed by the BVerfG
have been incorporated into the Basic Law in the context of the ratiﬁcation of the
Maastricht Treaty (1992) by introducing a speciﬁc article (Art. 23) dedicated to
European integration. Its ﬁrst paragraph reads: “With a view to establishing a united
(Footnote 5 continued)
through the corresponding consti-tutional procedures.’ (DTC 1/2004, of 13 December, Ground
4).” Chap. 10 Art. 6 Constitution of Sweden: “protection for rights and freedoms in the ﬁeld of
cooperation to which the transfer relates corresponds to that afforded under this Instrument of
Government and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms”; UK: High Court, 18 February 2002 (Thoburn/Sunderland City Council et a.l), [2002]
EWHC 195 Admin, Nr. 69 (Lord Justice Laws): “In the event, which no doubt would never
happen in the real world, that a European measure was seen to be repugnant to a fundamental or
constitutional right guaranteed by the law of England, a question would arise whether the general
words of the [European Communities Act] were sufﬁcient to incorporate the measure and give it
overriding effect in domestic law”; Supreme Court, 22 January 2014, [2014] UKSC 3 – HS2, para
111 (Lord Reed): “There is in addition much to be said for the view, advanced by the German
Federal Constitutional Court … that as part of a co-operative relationship, a decision of the Court
of Justice should not be read by a national court in a way that places in question the identity of the
national constitutional order”, para 207 (Lord Neuberger and Lord Mance): “It is, putting the point
at its lowest, certainly arguable (and it is for United Kingdom law and courts to determine) that
there may be fundamental principles, whether contained in other constitutional instruments or
recognised at common law, of which Parliament when it enacted the European Communities Act
1972 did not either contemplate or authorise the abrogation”; further the overview in BVerfG,
Order of 15 December 2015 – 2 BvR 2735/14, para 47, and the contributions in: von Bogdandy
et al. (2008), §§ 14–26. From a comparative perspective: Huber (2008b), paras 29 ff., 65 ff., 91;
Grabenwarter (2009), p. 121; Mayer and Wendel (2014), paras 13 ff.; Wendel (2011), p. 104 ff;
Wollenschläger (2015b), para 23.
6BVerfG, Order of 22 October 1986 – 2 BvR 197/83, BVerfGE (reports) 73, 339, 376; further
Order of 12 May 1989 – 2 BvQ 3/89, NJW 1990, 974, 974; Order of 9 July 1992 – 2 BvR
1096/92, NVwZ 1993, 883, 883; Judgment of 12 October 1993 – 2 BvR 2134/92, 2 BvR 2159/92,
BVerfGE (reports) 89, 155, 174 f.; Order of 4 October 2011 – 1 BvL 3/08, BVerfGE (reports) 129,
186, 207 f. Cf. for a contextualisation of this jurisprudence, Davies (2015), p. 434.
7BVerfG, Order of 22 October 1986 – 2 BvR 197/83, BVerfGE (reports) 73, 386. The Solange
I-ruling of 29 May 1974 did not yet consider the fundamental rights protection on EU level as
adequate [BVerfG, Order of 29 May 1974 – 2 BvL 52/71, BVerfGE (reports) 37, 271, 285; see,
however, the dissenting opinions of justice Rupp, Hirsch and Wand, ibid, 291 ff]. The
Vielleicht-decision of 25.7.1979 indicated that a different assessment might be possible [BVerfG,
Order of 25 July 1979 – 2 BvL 6/77, BVerfGE (reports) 52, 187, 202 f.]. For restrictive tones:
Kirchhof (2014), p. 1538 ff.
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Europe, the Federal Republic of Germany shall participate in the development of
the European Union that is committed to democratic, social and federal principles,
to the rule of law, and to the principle of subsidiarity, and that guarantees a level of
protection of basic rights essentially comparable to that afforded by this Basic Law.
To this end the Federation may transfer sovereign powers by a law with the consent
of the Bundesrat. The establishment of the European Union, as well as changes in
its treaty foundations and comparable regulations that amend or supplement this
Basic Law, or make such amendments or supplements possible, shall be subject to
paragraphs (2) and (3) of Article 79.”8
These conditions for Germany’s participation in European integration have most
recently been afﬁrmed in the ruling of the BVerfG on the European Arrest Warrant
handed down on 15 December 2015. This judgment has, moreover, added in terms
of fundamental rights protection limits following from Germany’s constitutional
identity9 to those of the Solange jurisprudence (see on this at Sect. 2.2.2):
In general, sovereign acts of the European Union and acts of German public authority – to the
extent that they are determined by Union law – are, due to the precedence of application of
EuropeanUnion Law (Anwendungsvorrang des Unionsrechts),… not to bemeasured against
the standard of the fundamental rights enshrined in the Basic Law (1.). However, the prece-
dence of application of EuropeanUnion Law is limited by the constitutional principles that are
beyond the reach of European integration (integrationsfest) pursuant to Art. 23 sec. 1 sen-
tence 3 in conjunction with Art. 79 sec. 3 GG (2.). This in particular encompasses the
principles contained in Art. 1 GG, including the principle of individual guilt in criminal law,
which is rooted in the guarantee of human dignity (3.). It has to be ensured that, also in
applying the law of the EuropeanUnion or legal provisions that originate fromGerman public
authority but that are determined by Union law, these principles are guaranteed in every
individual case (4.). However, one can only claim a violation of this inalienable core of
fundamental rights protection before the Federal Constitutional Court if one submits in a
substantiated manner that the dignity of the person is in fact interfered with (5.).
1. Pursuant to Art. 23 sec. 1 sentence 1 GG, the Federal Republic of Germany participates
in establishing and developing the European Union. Uniform application of its law is of
central importance for the success of the European Union … Without ensuring uniform
application and effectiveness of its law, it would not be able to continue to exist as a legal
community of currently 28 Member States … In this respect, Art. 23 sec. 1 GG also
assures that Union law is effective and will be enforced …
Therefore, through the authorisation to transfer sovereign powers to the European Union—
an authorisation provided under Art. 23 sec. 1 sentence 2 GG –, the Basic Law endorses
the precedence of application accorded to Union law by the Acts of Assent to the Treaties.
As a rule, the precedence of application of European Union Law also applies with regard to
national constitutional law …, and, in conflict, as a rule, it results in national law being
inapplicable in the speciﬁc case …
Based on Art. 23 sec. 1 GG, the legislature deciding on European integration matters not
only may, generally and in all matters, exempt European Union institutions and agencies
from being bound by the fundamental rights and other guarantees under the Basic Law, to
8Translation available at https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/englisch_gg.html#p0125,
accessed 3 January 2017.
9Cf. for a critical view on the identity review only Ingold (2015), p. 1.
Fundamental Rights Regimes in the European Union: Contouring … 27
the extent that they exercise public authority in Germany, but also German entities that
execute law of the European Union… This in particular applies to the legislature at federal
and at state level if they transpose secondary or tertiary law without possessing a leeway to
design (Gestaltungsspielraum) … In contrast, the legal acts that are issued in using an
existing leeway to design are amenable to scrutiny by the Federal Constitutional Court …
2. However, the precedence of application of European Union Law only applies insofar as
the Basic Law and the Act of Assent permit or provide for the transfer of sovereign powers
… The national order giving effect to Union law at national level
(Rechtsanwendungsbefehl), contained in the Act of Assent, may only be given within the
framework of the applicable constitutional order… Limits to opening German statehood—
limits that apply beyond the speciﬁc design of the European integration agenda laid down
in the Act of Assent—follow from the Basic Law’s constitutional identity as stipulated in
Art. 79 sec. 3 GG (a). This is compatible with the principle of sincere cooperation
(Art. 4 sec. 3 TEU) (b) and is corroborated by the fact that the constitutional law of most
Member States of the European Union contains similar limits (c).
(a) The scope of precedence of application of European Union Law is mainly limited by the
Basic Law’s constitutional identity that, according toArt. 23 sec. 1 sentence 3 in conjunction
with Art. 79 sec. 3 GG, is beyond the reach of both constitutional amendment and European
integration (verfassungsänderungs- und integrationsfest) (aa). The constitutional identity is
safeguarded by the identity review conducted by the Federal Constitutional Court. (bb).
(b) To the extent that acts of an institution or an agency of the European Union have an effect
that affects the constitutional identity protected by Art. 79 sec. 3 GG in conjunction with the
principles laid down in Arts. 1 and 20 GG, they transgress the limits of open statehood set by
the Basic Law. Such an act cannot be based on an authorisation under primary law, because
the legislature deciding on European integration matters, despite acting with the majority
required by Art. 23 sec. 1 sentence 3 GG in conjunction with Art. 79 sec. 2 GG, cannot
transfer sovereign powers to the European Union which, if exercised, would affect the con-
stitutional identity protected by Art. 79 sec. 3 GG … Nor can it be based on initially con-
stitutional conferrals that have supposedly evolved through a development of the law, because
the institution or the agency of the European Union would thereby act ultra vires …
(c) Within the framework of the identity review, one has to review whether the principles
laid down as inalienable by Art. 79 sec. 3 GG are affected by an act of the European Union
… The result of such a review may be that in exceptional cases—as is the case with the
“Solange” reservation (“as long as” reservation) … or with the ultra vires review … –,
Union law must be declared inapplicable in Germany. However, to prevent German
authorities and courts from simply disregarding the Union law’s claim to validity, the
application of Art. 79 sec. 3 GG in a manner that is open to European law in order to
protect the effectiveness of the Union legal order and that takes into account the legal
concept expressed in Art. 100 s. 1 GG require that ﬁnding a violation of the constitutional
identity is reserved for the Federal Constitutional Court… This is underlined by Art. 100 s.
2 GG according to which in case of doubts whether a general rule of international law
creates rights and duties for the individual, the court must refer the question to the Federal
Constitutional Court… An identity review may also be triggered by a constitutional
complaint (Art. 93 sec. 1 no. 4a GG)….10
10BVerfG, Order of 15 December 2015 – 2 BvR 2735/14, paras 36 ff., English translation
available at http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2015/12/
rs20151215_2bvr273514en.html, accessed 3 January 2017. See also the Lisbon-judgment of the
BVerfG: BVerfG, Judgment of 30 June 2009 – 2 BvE 2/08, BVerfGE (reports) 123, 267, 335, 399,
paras 191, 337 of the English translation, available at http://www.bverfg.de/e/es20090630_
2bve000208en.html, accessed 13 January 2017.
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2.2.2 Mitigation of Possible Conflicts by Substantive and Procedural
Safeguards
The application of (at least) two different fundamental rights regimes to EU acts,
moreover interpreted by different institutions (the ECJ and national constitutional
courts), may undoubtedly give rise to constitutional conflicts. The possibility of such
conflicts is however ﬁrst of all mitigated by the fact that, in the context of European
integration, the Basic Law does not require an identical standard of fundamental
rights protection, but only one which is comparable (cf. notably Art. 23 para.
1 sentence 1 GG: “a level of protection of basic rights essentially comparable to that
afforded by this Basic Law”). Moreover, various procedural safeguards apply.11 First
of all, only the BVerfG may declare an EU act inapplicable in terms of the German
legal order.12 Next, the ordinary courts must refer the case to the ECJ in order to
enable the latter to assess the conformity of the EU act in question with EU law
before the BVerfG may be called upon to declare the EU act inapplicable because of
a violation of (national) constitutional standards.13 If a constitutional complaint (e.g.
a constitutional complaint against a statute) is admissible without the prior
involvement of the ordinary courts, this implies a reference to the ECJ by the
BVerfG itself—a requirement which the BVerfG has mentioned,14 but it has not
followed this path in the context of fundamental rights so far15—unlike
11See for an overview, Wollenschläger (2014a), para 14.
12BVerfG, Order of 29 May 1974 – 2 BvL 52/71, BVerfGE (reports) 37, 284 f.; further Judgment
of 30 June 2009 – 2 BvE 2/08, BVerfGE (reports) 123, 354, para 241 of the English translation,
available at http://www.bverfg.de/e/es20090630_2bve000208en.html, accessed 13 January 2017;
BVerfG, Order of 15 December 2015 – 2 BvR 2735/14, para 43, English translation available at
http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2015/12/rs20151215_
2bvr273514en.html, accessed 3 January 2017.
13BVerfG, Order of 29 May 1974 – 2 BvL 52/71, BVerfGE (reports) 37, 271, 281; further Order of
4 October 2011 – 1 BvL 3/08, BVerfGE (reports) 129, 186, 207 f.; Seidel (2003), p. 97. See also
ECJ, Joined Cases C-188/10 and C-189/10, Melki und Abdeli, [2010] ECR I-5667, paras 52 ff.
14See only BVerfG, Order of 24 January 2012 – 1 BvR 1299/05, BVerfGE (reports) 130, 151, 177
f.; Judgment of 2 March 2010 – 1 BvR 256/08, 1 BvR 263/08, 1 BvR 586/08, BVerfGE (reports)
125, 260, 307 f. See further BVerfG, Order of 15 December 2015 – 2 BvR 2735/14, para 46,
English translation available at http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/
Entscheidungen/EN/2015/12/rs20151215_2bvr273514en.html, accessed 3 January 2017. For
such an obligation: Sauer (2016), p. 1137.
15BVerfG, Order of 24 January 2012 – 1 BvR 1299/05, BVerfGE (reports) 130, 151, 191 f.;
Judgment of 2 March 2010 – 1 BvR 256/08, 1 BvR 263/08, 1 BvR 586/08, BVerfGE (reports)
125, 260, 308. For a critical view on not having referred cases to the ECJ so far, von Danwitz
(2013), p. 261; Huber (2009), p. 582; Kingreen (2013a), p. 809 f. Reservedly: Britz (2015), p. 280
f. Beyond fundamental rights issues, the BVerfG has, for the very ﬁrst time, made a reference to
the ECJ in the OMT-case, see BVerfG, Judgment of 14 January 2014 – 2 BvR 2728/13, 2 BvR
2729/13, 2 BvR 2730/13, 2 BvR 2731/13, 2 BvE 13/13, NJW 2014, 907; a further example is the
recent reference in the case of the ECB's Expanded Asset Purchase Programme, see BVerfG, Order
of 18 July 2017 – 2 BvR 859/15, 2 BvR 980/16, 2 BvR 2006/15, 2 BvR 1651/15.
Fundamental Rights Regimes in the European Union: Contouring … 29
constitutional courts of other Member States.16 Moreover, in its recent ruling in the
European Arrest Warrant case of 15 December 2015, the BVerfG applied the “acte
clair” doctrine to deny the necessity of a preliminary reference to the ECJ before an
EU act can be declared inapplicable:
There is no need for a preliminary ruling by the Court of Justice of the European Union
under Art. 267 TFEU. The correct application of Union law is so obvious as to leave no
scope for any reasonable doubt (“acte clair”, cf. ECJ, Judgment of 6 October 1982, CILFIT,
283/81 [1982] ECR p. 3415, paras. 16 et seq.). In the case at hand, there is no conflict
between Union law and the protection of human dignity under Art. 1 sec. 1 GG in con-
junction with Art. 23 sec. 1 sentence 3 in conjunction with Art. 79 sec. 3 GG. As shown
above, the Framework Decision on the European arrest warrant does not require German
courts and authorities to execute a European arrest warrant without reviewing its compli-
ance with the requirements ensuing from Art. 1 sec. 1 GG. This is not changed by the fact
that the limits of the obligation to investigate and establish the facts of the case, in particular
as regards the scope of investigations permissible under Union law and the related delays in
the execution of the arrest warrant, have not yet clearly been deﬁned in the case-law of the
Court of Justice of the European Union. At least in the case to be decided here, there is no
indication of a conflict of Union law with the obligation of the Higher Regional Court to
examine more extensively whether the complainant’s rights would be safeguarded. This
holds true in particular for the substantiated indications submitted by the complainant to the
Higher Regional Court that under Italian [criminal] procedural law he was not afforded an
opportunity to defend himself effectively.17
Furthermore, the danger of conflicts is minimised by the strict conditions for
admissibility of constitutional review aiming at declaring an EU act inadmissible:
The applicant has to substantiate in detail that the minimum standard of funda-
mental rights protection required by the Basic Law is not generally secured at EU
level.18 In its judgment in the recent European Arrest Warrant case of 15 December
16See Österr. VerfGH, 28 November 2012 – G47/12 et al. (Seitlinger u.a.); Corte Cost., 13
February 2008 – 102/2008 (Tasse di Lusso Sardegna); Conseil Const., 4 April 2013 – 2013-314P
QPC (M. Jeremy F.).
17BVerfG, Order of 15 December 2015 – 2 BvR 2735/14, para 125, English translation available at
http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2015/12/rs20151215_
2bvr273514en.html, accessed 3 January 2017. Cf. for a critical view on refraining from referring
the case to the ECJ, Nowag (2016), p. 1450 f.,—identifying a new interpretation of the
CILFIT-doctrine requiring a reference only in cases of conflict between national and EU law;
Reinbacher and Wendel (2016), p. 342 f.; Rung (2016), p. 149 f.
18BVerfG, Order of 7 June 2000 – 2 BvL 1/97, BVerfGE (reports) 102, 147, 164; further Order of
9 January 2001 – 1 BvR 1036/99, NJW 2001, 1267, 1267 f; Order of 13 March 2007 – 1 BvF
1/05, BVerfGE (reports) 118, 79, 95; Order of 14 May 2007 – 1 BvR 2036/05, NVwZ 2007, 942,
942; Order of 14 October 2008 – 1 BvF 4/05, BVerfGE (reports) 122, 1, 20; Judgment of 30 June
2009 – 2 BvE 2/08, BVerfGE (reports) 123, 267, 334 f, paras 190 f. of the English translation,
available at http://www.bverfg.de/e/es20090630_2bve000208en.html, accessed 13 January 2017.
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2015, the BVerfG has relativized19 this wide test by declaring—as a consequence of
the protection of Germany’s constitutional identity—a (possible) infringement of
human dignity always subject to constitutional review (and not only if a general
deﬁcit in EU fundamental rights protection has become manifest).20 This might be a
potentially wide relativisation since the identity control extends not only to the right
to human dignity itself (Art. 1 para. 1 GG), but to the core content of other
fundamental rights which is inherent in human dignity.21 A subsequent ruling of the
BVerfG has however followed a restrictive path by stressing the limited extent of
what might be considered the core content of fundamental rights-based require-
ments (such as of the right not to incriminate oneself).22 Moreover, here too a
19For the further relevance of the Solange-II-jurisprudence (beyond human dignity issues),
Reinbacher and Wendel (2016), p. 334 f.
20BVerfG, Order of 15 December 2015 – 2 BvR 2735/14, para 34, English translation available at
http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2015/12/rs20151215_
2bvr273514en.html, accessed 3 January 2017: “If a violation of the guarantee of human dignity is
asserted, the Federal Constitutional Court reviews such a serious violation of a fundamental right
in the context of the identity review...—notwithstanding its past jurisprudence declaring inad-
missible both constitutional complaints and referrals in speciﬁc judicial review proceedings that
assert a violation of fundamental rights under the Basic Law by secondary Community law or
Union law respectively”. Cf. for a critical view on this deviation, Sauer (2016), p. 1135 ff. Since
the BVerfG has seen in casu no conflict between EU law and national law (in terms of fundamental
rights protection), the application of the identity-control is criticised, see, Reinbacher and Wendel
(2016), p. 336 f.; Rung (2016), p. 148 f.; Sauer (2016), p. 1135 f. Nuanced: Hong (2016), p. 553 ff.
21BVerfG, Judgment of 21 June 2016—BvR 2728/13, para 138 (OMT); further Order of 6
September 2016 – 2 BvR 890/16, paras 36, 39. See also Hong (2016), p. 557.
22See BVerfG, Order of 6 September 2016 – 2 BvR 890/16, para 36: “Daraus, dass der Grundsatz
der Selbstbelastungsfreiheit in der Menschenwürde wurzelt, folgt allerdings nicht, dass jede ver-
fassungsrechtlich gewährleistete Ausprägung dieses Grundsatzes auch unmittelbar dem Schutz
von Art. 1 GG unterﬁele. Die Beachtung dieses Grundsatzes wird verfassungsrechtlich durch Art.
2 Abs. 1 in Verbindung mit Art. 20 Abs. 3 GG sowie Art. 2 Abs. 1 in Verbindung mit Art. 1 Abs.
1 GG sichergestellt. Nur wenn der unmittelbar zur Menschenwürde gehörende Kerngehalt der
Selbstbelastungsfreiheit berührt ist, liegt auch eine Verletzung von Art. 1 GG vor. Dies wäre etwa
der Fall, wenn ein Beschuldigter durch Zwangsmittel dazu angehalten würde, eine selbstbelastende
Aussage zu tätigen und so die Voraussetzungen für seine strafgerichtliche Verurteilung zu
schaffen. Dagegen folgt unmittelbar aus Art. 1 GG nicht, dass ein Schweigen des Beschuldigten
unter keinen Umständen einer Beweiswürdigung unterzogen und gegebenenfalls zu seinem
Nachteil verwendet werden darf. Dementsprechend hat das Bundesverfassungsgericht nicht
beanstandet, dass in bestimmten Konstellationen des sogenannten Teilschweigens aus dem
Aussageverhalten des Beschuldigten im Rahmen der Beweiswürdigung Schlüsse zu dessen
Nachteil gezogen werden (vgl. BVerfGK 17, 223 <227>), obgleich auch in derartigen Fällen die
Selbstbelastungsfreiheit berührt ist und ein gewisser Aussagedruck entstehen kann. Vor dem
Hintergrund, dass die Achtung der Menschenwürde eine Würdigung und Verwertung des
Schweigens zum Nachteil des Beschuldigten nicht unter allen Umständen verbietet, sind auch die
Ausführungen der 3. Kammer des Zweiten Senats in ihrem Beschluss vom 22. Juni 1992 (2 BvR
1901/91, juris, Rn. 10 f.) zu verstehen, wonach eine Auslieferung von Verfassungs wegen auch
dann zulässig sein kann, wenn das Schweigen des Beschuldigten im ersuchenden Staat als
belastendes Indiz gewertet werden darf. Eine Auslieferung auf der Grundlage eines Europäischen
Haftbefehls ist somit nicht schon dann unzulässig, wenn die Selbstbelastungsfreiheit im
Prozessrecht des ersuchenden Staates nicht in demselben Umfang gewährleistet ist, wie dies von
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sufﬁciently substantiated application on the part of the complainant is required:
“The strict requirements for activating the identity review are paralleled by stricter
admissibility requirements for constitutional complaints that raise such an issue.
The complainant must substantiate in detail to what extent the guarantee of human
dignity that is protected by Art. 1 GG is violated in the individual case.”23 Finally,
further potential conflicts are averted by interpreting (national) constitutional
standards in the light of standards enshrined in EU law.24
2.2.3 Evaluation
In view of the high standards for declaring an EU act inapplicable in the German
legal order, the Solange-Vorbehalt has been widely considered a theoretical option
only.25 The practical relevance of limitations on European integration in terms of
fundamental rights has however been demonstrated by the recent ruling of the
BVerfG on the European Arrest Warrant of 15 December 2015—which is already
referred to as “Solange III” ruling26,27 The BVerfG held an order of Düsseldorf
Higher Regional Court which declared the extradition of a person on the basis of a
European Arrest Warrant permissible to be a violation of the fundamental right of
human dignity (Art. 1 para. 1 GG), although this decision was determined by EU
law. For, the court order related to a sentence that was rendered in absentia did not
respect the principle of individual guilt, that is based on human dignity and thus
belongs to the German constitutional identity (again, it should be stressed that this
identity review is not identical to the Solange jurisprudence):
(Footnote 22 continued)
Verfassungs wegen im deutschen Strafverfahren der Fall ist. Vielmehr ist die Auslieferung erst
dann unzulässig, wenn selbst der dem Schutz von Art. 1 GG unterfallende Kernbereich des
nemo-tenetur-Grundsatzes nicht mehr gewährleistet ist.”
23BVerfG, Order of 15 December 2015 – 2 BvR 2735/14, para 50, English translation available at
http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2015/12/rs20151215_
2bvr273514en.html, accessed 3 January 2017. Emphasising the need for a restrictive application:
Reinbacher and Wendel (2016), p. 335.
24BVerfG, Order of 7 July 2009 – 1 BvR 1164/07, BVerfGE (reports) 124, 199, 220, 233; further
Order of 30 April 2003 – 1 PBvU 1/02, BVerfGE (reports) 107, 395, 409; Order of 4 May 2004 –
1 BvR 1892/03, BVerfGE (reports) 110, 339, 342; (left open in casu) Order of 26 August 2013 – 2
BvR 441/13, NJW 2013, 1540, 1542.
25See notably Dederer (2006), p. 597; Hoffmann-Riem (2002), p. 476; Huber (2008b), para 36;
Kühling (2009), p. 702 f; Liisberg (2001), p. 1195; Lindner (2007b), p. 190 f; Ludwigs (2014),
p. 274; Masing (2006), p. 265; idem (2016), p. 496: “reservation for extremely exceptional cases”;
Rung (2016), p. 147; Szczekalla (2006), p. 1021; Voßkuhle (2010), p. 6; Walter (2004), p. 40.
26See Hong (2016), p. 550: “As long as the German Constitution remains in force, the German
Federal Constitutional Court will enforce the Constitution’s right to human dignity, law of the
European Union notwithstanding.” Reservedly: Reinbacher and Wendel (2016), p. 334.
27Qualifying this judgment as a partial overruling of Solange II: Sauer (2016), p. 1135; further
Nowag (2016), p. 1447 ff.
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The challenged decision rendered by the Higher Regional Court transgresses the limits set
by Art. 1 sec. 1 in conjunction with Art. 23 sec. 1 sentence 3 and Art. 79 sec. 3 GG.
Executing the Framework Decision on the European arrest warrant affects the principle of
individual guilt, a principle that is rooted in the guarantee of human dignity (Art.
1 sec. 1 GG) and in the principle of the rule of law (Art. 20 s. 3 GG) and that forms part of
the inalienable constitutional identity under the Basic Law (1.). This fact justiﬁes and
mandates a review of the Higher Regional Court’s decision, a review according to the
standards of the Basic Law, but limited to this protected interest, although the Higher
Regional Court’s decision is determined by Union law (2.). On the one hand, the
requirements set by Union law, and by German law transposing it, on which the decision is
based, comply with the requirements set by Art. 1 sec. 1 GG, as they guarantee the
mandatory rights of the requested person in the context of extraditions for the purpose of
executing sentences rendered in absence of the person concerned and as they do not only
allow the courts that deal with the extradition to investigate appropriately, but they demand
it (3.). On the other hand, however, in applying those provisions, the Higher Regional Court
violated the principle of individual guilt and thereby violated the complainant’s right under
Art. 1 sec. 1 GG, because with regard to the interpretation of the dispositions of the
Framework Decision and the Act on International Cooperation in Criminal Matters, its
application of the law did not adequately take into account the signiﬁcance and the scope of
human dignity (4.).28
In keeping with similar reservations voiced by other constitutional courts, the
Solange-Vorbehalt must not be seen as a threat to the primacy and uniform
application of EU law pure and simple. Rather, it may also contribute to an
improvement of fundamental rights standards at EU level by means of a judicial
dialogue.29 This has been the case for the initial Solange jurisprudence as well as
for similar reservations, notably formulated by the Italian Corte Costituzionale.30
And it was also the case in the context of the European Arrest Warrant. Here, the
aforementioned judgment of the BVerfG moved the ECJ to emphasise EU funda-
mental rights standards in this respect only a few months later.31
2.3 Reconciling the Perspectives
Despite the different perspectives of the ECJ, on the one hand, and of the national
constitutions/national constitutional courts on the other, with regard to the relevance
of national fundamental rights for European integration, tendencies towards rec-
onciling the perspectives have become manifest.
28BVerfG, Order of 15 December 2015 – 2 BvR 2735/14, para 51, English translation available at
http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2015/12/rs20151215_
2bvr273514en.html, accessed 3 January 2017.
29See from a general perspective: Poli (2016), p. 373.
30Reservedly: Reinbacher and Wendel (2016), p. 343.
31ECJ, Joined Cases C-404/15 and C-659/15, Aranyosi und Căldăraru, EU:C:2016:198. See on
this, Hong (2016), p. 561 ff.; Nowag (2016), p. 1452 f.; Dietz (2016), p. 1383 ff.; Reinbacher and
Wendel (2016), p. 337 ff.
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First, the constitutional traditions common to the Member States have since the
beginning constituted one source for developing EU fundamental rights (Art.
6 para. 3 TEU; Art. 52 para. 4 CFR), albeit the plurality of national traditions acts as
a brake on approximation.32 Similarly, national fundamental rights are interpreted
in the light of EU law standards (cf. Sect. 2.2.2).
Moreover, since Maastricht, Art. 4 para. 2 sentence 1 TEU has required the EU to
respect the national identities of the Member States “inherent in their fundamental
structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local
self-government.”33 Thus, EU law itself acknowledges limits to European integra-
tion in view of the national constitutional identity. It however remains a limitation of
EU law, so that it is up to the ECJ to ultimately deﬁne its scope. This notwith-
standing, the reference procedure enables a constructive dialogue between the latter
and the courts of the Member States.34 One example is the Omega case, in which the
ECJ qualiﬁed a prohibition of laser quest games—issued in view of human dignity
(Art. 1 para. 1 GG), and thus in view of German constitutional identity—Please
change to identity—as a justiﬁed restriction on the freedom to provide services.35
3 Delimitation of National and EU Fundamental Rights
with Regard to Member State Action
While the so-called Solange-Vorbehalt (Provisional Reservation) discussed in the
previous section, and ﬁrst formulated in 1974, intends to secure the adequate
protection of fundamental rights with respect to an action of the European Union,
the perspective has taken a 180° turn since the end of the 1980s. Central importance
no longer attaches to the question raised in the Solange jurisprudence’s with regard
32See on this Kokott and Sobotta (2010), p. 266; Wollenschläger (2010), paras 85 f.
Overemphasising the relevance of national fundamental rights standards with regard to Art.
53 CFR: Hwang (2014), p. 411 ff.; idem (2016), p. 369.
33See on this clause: von Bogdandy and Schill (2010), p. 711 ff; Lerche (1996), p. 919; Pernice
(2011), p. 185; Wendel (2011), p. 572 ff. The BVerfG has, in its Lisbon judgment, parallelised Art.
79 para 3 GG with Art. 4 para 2 sentence 1 TEU [cf. BVerfG, Judgment of 30 June 2009 – 2 BvE
2/08, BVerfGE (reports) 123, 267, 354, 400, paras 235, 339 of the English translation, available at
http://www.bverfg.de/e/es20090630_2bve000208en.html, accessed 13 January 2017; similarly
Tryb. Konst., 24 November 2010—K 32/09, III.2.1, EuGRZ 2012, 172 (Lissabon)], but, in the
meantime, deviated from this qualiﬁcation, see BVerfG, Order of 14 January 2014 – 2 BvR
2728/13, BVerfGE (reports) 134, 366 (386 f., para 29).
34See only, Franzius (2015a), p. 401 f.; idem (2015b), p. 150.
35ECJ, Case C-36/02, Omega, [2004] ECR I-9609. See further Case C-379/87, Groener, [1989]
ECR 3967, paras 12 ff; Case C-159/90, Grogan, [1991] ECR I-4685, paras 24 ff; Case C-208/09,
Sayn-Wittgenstein, [2010] ECR I-13693, para 92—with explicit reference to Art. 4 para 2 sentence
1 TEU. See insofar also, Besselink, (2012), p. 678 ff; von Bogdandy and Schill (2010), p. 707 f;
von Danwitz (2008), p. 783 ff; Mayer et al. (2008), p. 71 f, 86 f; Pernice (2011), p. 204 f;
Voßkuhle (2010), p. 7; Wollenschläger (2010), paras 83 f.
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to the extent to which an indispensable national fundamental rights standard
restricts the applicability of EU law at national level. The particularly acute issue is
now in fact the question of the extent to which the EU’s fundamental rights, ﬁnally
codiﬁed with the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon, are also binding on the Member States.36
A somewhat broad approach taken by the ECJ contrasts here with a somewhat
restrictive stance assumed by the BVerfG. It has been established in Karlsruhe’s
settled case-law that national fundamental rights do not apply to national measures
in as far as they implement mandatory requirements of EU law. The EU’s funda-
mental rights come into effect in this regard (see Sect. 2.2). However, the expansive
tendencies that are evident especially in the Fransson judgment of the ECJ of
26 February 201337 were countered by the BVerfG a mere 2 months later in its
judgment of 24 April 2013 regarding the anti-terror database, with the words “thus
far and no further”. Karlsruhe not only considered the expansive applicability of EU
fundamental rights to the Member States to constitute an ultra vires act, but also
established a new barrier to European integration assigned to the inviolable identity
of the German constitutional order (Art. 79 para. 3 GG)—namely that a substantial
scope for national fundamental rights protection has to be preserved.38
Given the issues at stake here, this is understandable.39 Experience in federal
systems (for example, in the German federal state or in the USA) demonstrates that
a considerable potential for unitarisation resides within central catalogues of fun-
damental rights—also in areas for which there are no, or only weak, competences at
the federal level –, in particular if interpreted in activist jurisprudence; this is
accompanied by a marginalization of the Member States’ fundamental rights as well
as of the (state) constitutional courts entrusted with their protection.40 This is
problematical, and especially so with regard to well-functioning, differentiated
systems of protection such as the protection of fundamental rights in Germany. On
the other hand, federal experience also demonstrates that legal unity and precedence
of federal law require uniform fundamental rights standards.
It is against this background that this article raises the question of the scope of
application of EU fundamental rights to the Member States. I will be focussing
primarily on the substantive delimitation of the spheres of fundamental rights,
which will comprise the ﬁrst two parts of this section (Sects. 3.1 and 3.2). In the
third part (Sect. 3.3), I will be looking briefly at the institutional and procedural
dimensions.
36On this, see Wollenschläger (2014a), paras 10 ff. Snell (2015), p. 295, speaks of “a certain irony”
inherent in this development. This section updates Wollenschläger (2015a).
37ECJ, Case C-617/10, Fransson, EU:C:2013:105, paras 17 ff.
38BVerfG, Judgment of 24 April 2013 – 1 BvR 1215/07, BVerfGE (reports) 133, 277, 316;
English translation available at http://www.bverfg.de/e/rs20130424_1bvr121507en.html, accessed
13 January 2017.
39On this and the following, see Eeckhout (2002), p. 945; Groussot et al. (2013), p. 100 f.; Huber
(2008a), p. 190, 198 f.; idem (2011), p. 2385 f.; Kirchhof (2011), p. 3681 f.; Mayer (2009), p. 93;
Wollenschläger (2014a), paras 16, 29 ff.
40Cf. already Ipsen (1968), p. 125; further Masing (2016), p. 509 ff.; Snell (2015), p. 286 f.
Fundamental Rights Regimes in the European Union: Contouring … 35
According to the jurisprudence of the ECJ established since the end of the 1980s,
Member States are bound by EU fundamental rights if national authorities act
“within the scope of application of EU law”.41 Art. 51 para. 1 sentence 1 CFR is
somewhat more reserved in its formulation, and orders an obligation incumbent on
Member States to apply EU fundamental rights “only when they are implementing
Union law”. Three cases may be distinguished.42 First, the implementation and
enforcement of EU law, notably of EU directives and EU regulations. Second,
action by Member States in a context that is determined by EU law in some manner,
a category still lacking in proﬁle and to which the aforementioned Fransson case
belongs. Third, Member State action in the context of restricting the EU’s funda-
mental freedoms, a category which was ﬁercely called into question shortly after the
Charter came into force. This article will not deal with the third category. In my
view, however, the dimension of EU fundamental rights in this constellation is
exaggerated, since there is no doubt that EU law determines autonomously the
admissibility and extent of limitations to the fundamental freedoms—the only issue
to be avoided is to comprehensively apply EU fundamental rights on the occasion
of a restriction on fundamental freedoms.43
3.1 The Implementation and Enforcement of EU Secondary
Law
An obligation to apply EU fundamental rights exists under Art. 51 para. 1 sentence
1 CFR when Member States implement EU law, particularly including the
enforcement of an EU regulation or the implementation of an EU directive. What is
disputed, however, is the extent of the obligation. Do Member States only have an
obligation to respect EU fundamental rights when they implement obligatory
requirements of EU law, or do they also have to do so when they are granted
discretionary power? Both cases also raise the question of the parallel applicability
of national fundamental rights beyond EU fundamental rights.44
When implementing mandatory requirements of Union law, the Member States
are not only bound by EU fundamental rights. Rather, securing the precedence and
uniform application of EU law precludes the parallel application of national fun-
damental rights, even though national implementation acts do exist. This has been
41ECJ, Joined Cases 60/84 and 61/84, Cinéthèque, [1995] ECR 2605, para 26 (“area”); Case
C-260/89, ERT, [1991] ECR I-2925, para 42; Case C-368/95, Familiapress, [1997] ECR I-3689,
para 24; Case C-276/01, Steffensen, [2003] ECR I-3735, para 70.
42See, Wollenschläger (2014a), paras 16 ff.
43Cf. the so-called ERT-jurisprudence (ECJ, Case C-260/89, ERT, [1991] ECR I-2925, paras 42
ff.); also conﬁrmed after the CFR has entered into force in ECJ, Case C-390/12, Pfleger, EU:
C:2014:281, paras 30 ff. Cf. for a detailed discussion, Wollenschläger (2014a), paras 25 ff.; idem
(2014b), p. 577. Reservedly: Snell (2015), p. 304 ff.
44Cf. for more details and with further references, Wollenschläger (2014a), paras 18 ff.
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recognized—within the limits of the Solange jurisprudence and constitutional
identity (see Sect. 2.2)—by the BVerfG, and convincingly so.45 Let us take the
example of EU Directive 2006/24/EU on data retention (which has since been held
void because it infringes EU fundamental rights46). Here, national legislation
implements the obligation incumbent on telecommunications providers to retain
connection data as stipulated by EU secondary law. If we were to examine these
national implementation acts in the light of national fundamental rights, the
retention of data made obligatory by EU law would depend on the result of the
national scrutiny of fundamental rights in the respective Member States. This
conflicts with the precedence and uniform application of EU law and—at least as
long as there is an adequate standard of protection at EU level—is also not
imperative in the interest of protecting fundamental rights. Besides, given that they
have no leeway of their own, the Member States function as an extended arm of the
EU, so that, from a substantive point of view, there can be no question of their
exercising national sovereign power.47
The situation is different in cases where EU law grants discretion to Member
States with regard to implementation—in our example, Member States may
determine how long telecommunications providers have to retain data on
telecommunications connections for periods ranging between 6 and 24 months.
Nevertheless, the ECJ assumes that Member States are also obliged to adhere to
EU fundamental rights in the case of discretion. This is because such discre-
tion has been granted by EU law.48 This approach is not
45BVerfG, Order of 13 March 2007 – 1 BvF 1/05, BVerfGE (reports) 118, 79, 95 ff. Afﬁrmative:
Britz (2015), p. 276. Cf. for a critical view with regard to the criterion of determinedness, Sauer
(2016), p. 1135 f.; further, Franzius (2015b), p. 148 ff., 152. In view of the primacy of EU law, it is
admissible to scrutinise the national measures with regard to national fundamental rights and
conﬁrm it (only a declaration as unconstitutional would be problematic), cf. only BVerfG, Order of
02 March 2010—BVerfGE (reports) 125, 260, 309, para 187 of the English translation, available
at http://www.bverfg.de/e/rs20100302_1bvr025608en.html, accessed 13 January 2017: “With
these contents, the Directive can be implemented in German law without violating the fundamental
rights of the Basic Law. The Basic Law does not prohibit such storage in all circumstances. On the
contrary, even independent of any priority of Community law, it may permissibly be ordered in
compliance with the fundamental rights enshrined in the Basic Law (see IV below). A review of
the challenged provisions as a whole by the yardstick of German fundamental rights is therefore
not in conflict with Directive 2006/24/EC, and therefore the validity and priority of the latter is not
relevant.”; Bäcker (2015), p. 409 f.; Britz (2015), p. 277.
46ECJ, Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd et al., EU:C:2014:238.
47Cf. ECJ, Case C-206/13, Siragusa, EU:C:2014:126, para 32; von Danwitz (2013), p. 259;
Dederer (2006), p. 584; Jacobs (2001), p. 333 f.; Masing (2016), p. 499 f.; Snell (2015), p. 301 f.;
Weiler and Fries (1999), p. 161 f.
48Cf. ECJ, Case C-540/03, Parliament/Council, [2006] ECR I-5769, paras 104 f.; further Joined
Cases C-411/10 and C-493/10, N.S. et al., [2011] ECR I-13905, paras 64 ff.; Case C-418/11,
Texdata, EU:C:2013:588, paras 70 ff.: “In the present case, the main proceedings concern the
penalty imposed for failure to comply with the disclosure obligation, as laid down in the Eleventh
Directive. As can be seen from paragraph 49 above, the EU legislature, by Article 12 of the
Eleventh Directive, left the Member States responsible for determining the appropriate penalties—
that is to say, penalties which are effective, proportionate and dissuasive—in order to ensure
Fundamental Rights Regimes in the European Union: Contouring … 37
uncontroversial.49 At ﬁrst sight, there appear to be good reasons for this restrictive
position.50 True, an obligation incumbent on the Member States with regard to EU
fundamental rights, also when enjoying discretion, is still covered by the wording of
Art. 51 para. 1 sentence 1 CFR, referring to “implementing”. However, the addition
of the word “only”, and the fact that it contains reservations regarding Member
States’ competences [cf. only Art. 51 para. 2 CFR; cf. further Art. 6 para. 1 subpara.
2 TEU], means that EU law expresses a somewhat restrictive tendency. Moreover,
the unitarisation effect resulting from an obligation with regard to EU fundamental
rights questions the granting of discretion to the Member States. Finally, if EU law
opens up various options to the Member States, then choosing one of these options
does not endanger the uniform application of EU law.
However convincing this delimitation of the spheres of fundamental rights may
seem at ﬁrst, we must not overlook its problems and limitations.51 For, differenti-
ating between obligatory requirements of a directive and those that grant discretion
may artiﬁcially split up a uniform set of circumstances and its regulatory context,
which can give rise not only to legal difﬁculties, but also to deﬁcits in terms of
protection, since protection of fundamental rights is then parcelled out. Having said
that, the following objection is even more important, and it signiﬁcantly reduces the
persuasiveness of the separation solution: Not every leeway is a leeway. For,
(Footnote 48 continued)
compliance with the disclosure obligation [para. 49: Under Article 12 of the Eleventh Directive,
Member States are to provide for appropriate penalties in the event of failure to disclose accounting
documents. However, that directive does not lay down more precise rules with regard to the
establishment of those national penalties and, in particular, it does not establish any explicit
criterion for the assessment of the proportionality of such penalties.]”; Bäcker (2015), p. 402 ff.;
von Bogdandy et al. (2012), p. 55; von Danwitz (2009), p. 27 ff.; Epiney (2007), p. 63 f.; Franzius
(2015b), p. 141; Griebel (2013), p. 388; Ladenburger (2012), p. 165; Lenaerts (2015), p. 354 f.;
Trstenjak and Beysen (2013), p. 304 ff.; Ward (2014), para 51.119.
49Disagreeing: ECJ, Case C-2/92, Bostock, [1993] ECR I-972, Opinion of AG Gulmann, paras 33
f.; Calliess (2009), p. 120 f.; Masing (2006), p. 267; further Kingreen (2016), paras 14 f.; idem
(2013b), p. 453. The position of the BVerfG is not entirely clear since most rulings only address
the issue of the applicability of national fundamental rights in this situation. A rejection of the
applicability of EU fundamental rights might be seen in BVerfG, Judgment of 24 April 2013 – 1
BvR 1215/07, BVerfGE (reports) 133, 277, 313 f.; English translation available at http://www.
bverfg.de/e/rs20130424_1bvr121507en.html, accessed 13 January 2017: “The European funda-
mental rights under the EUCFR are not applicable in the case at hand. The challenged provisions
must be measured against the fundamental rights under the Basic Law, if only because they are not
governed by Union law … Accordingly, this is also not a case of implementation of European
Union law, which alone could result in the Member States’ being bound by the Charter of
Fundamental Rights (Art. 51 sec. 1 sentence 1 EUCFR).” This ﬁnding is subsequently relativised,
though [see ibid., p. 316 and on this Thym (2013), p. 894 f.].
50See ECJ, Case C-2/92, Bostock, [1993] ECR I-972, Opinion of AG Gulmann, paras 33 f.;
Calliess (2009), p.120; Kingreen (2013b), p. 453; Lindner (2007b), p. 191 f.; Masing (2006),
p. 267.
51Cf. Calliess (2009), p. 121; von Danwitz (2009), p. 23, 27 f.; De Cecco (2006), p. 11; Di Fabio
(2006), p. 10 f., 15; Franzius (2015a), p. 391 f.; idem (2015b), p. 141; Lindner (2007a), p. 72;
Reinbacher and Wendel (2016), p. 336; Thym (2013), p. 892.
38 F. Wollenschläger
requirements of EU law might reduce the scope of discretion, where that latter
seems to be granted according to the wording of a directive. This is because
directives—given that they are acts of the Union legislature—have to be interpreted
in line with requirements of EU fundamental rights. In our example, therefore, the
question would arise as to whether the data retention period of between 6 and
24 months provided for in the directive is consistent with EU fundamental rights.
Were we to conclude that, in view of the considerable limitation of fundamental
rights, a maximum of 6 months’ retention is permitted at most, there would be no
leeway at national level at all. Hence, as a preliminary question for applying
national fundamental rights to national acts exercising discretion granted by EU
law, the question always arises as to whether and to what extent this leeway is
limited by EU law. A strict separation of spheres of fundamental rights is therefore
not possible in view of the layered process of law-making.52
Against this background, we have to consider the applicability of national
fundamental rights to acts of Member States that make use of discretionary powers.
As the ECJ has emphasized several times recently, national fundamental rights may
be applied, but only “provided that … neither the level of protection of the Charter
… nor the priority, the unity and the effectiveness of EU law is affected”.53 The
BVerfG applies national fundamental rights, but sometimes assumes a very broad
scope of discretion with regard to implementation (and does so without referring to
the ECJ).54
52Cf. on the interaction, ECJ, Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd
et al., EU:C:2014:238, paras 60 ff.; further Ohler (2013), p. 1437.
53Cf. ECJ, Case C-399/11, Melloni, EU:C:2013:107, para 60; further Case C-617/10, Fransson,
EU:C:2013:105, para 29; Opinion 2/13, EU:C:2014:2454, paras 187 f. (accession to the ECHR);
Case C-168/13, Jeremy F., ECLI:EU:C:2013:358, para 53; Wollenschläger (2014a), para 24, with
further references. See further—distinguishing three types of (EU) legislative consensus with
regard to remaining discretion of the Member States—Lenaerts (2015), p. 357 ff. See for a solution
for preserving national autonomy by granting a margin of appreciation to the Member States only
Bäcker (2015), p. 406 f.,—this approach is, however, questionable since it leads to double stan-
dards vis-à-vis the Member States and the EU and neglects that the task of the ECJ is not to
guarantee a minimum fundamental rights standard within the EU (like the EctHR), but to provide
full fundamental rights protection within the scope of applicability of EU law, cf. Wollenschläger
(2014a), para 77, with further references. Reservedly: Franzius (2015b), p. 141 ff. For a restrictive
approach questioning the primacy of EU (fundamental rights) law: Kirchhof (2014), p. 1538 ff.
Proposing a reversed Solange-formula, i.e. an application of national fundamental rights as long as
they guarantee adequate protection, Ludwigs (2014), p. 282.
54See only BVerfG, Order of 02 March 2010 – BVerfGE (reports) 125, 260, 308 f., English
translation available at http://www.bverfg.de/e/rs20100302_1bvr025608en.html, accessed 13
January 2017; Order of 19 July 2011 – 1 BvR 1916/09, BVerfGE (reports) 129, 78, 104 f.; Order
of 24 January 2011 – 1 BvR 1299/05, BVerfGE (reports) 130, 151, 186 ff. Cf. for a critical view
Griebel (2013), p. 386 ff., 395. Cf. further BVerfG, Order of 15 December 2015 – 2 BvR 2735/14,
English translation available at http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/
Entscheidungen/EN/2015/12/rs20151215_2bvr273514en.html, accessed 13 January 2017, and
on this Hong (2016), p. 553 ff.
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3.2 Member States’ Acting in a Context Determined by EU
Law
The question of whether Member States implement EU law, and are therefore bound
by EU fundamental rights, does not only arise with regard to obligations that are
clearly deﬁned by EU law, such as the previously discussed requirement contained
in an EU directive that data from telecommunication connections be retained for a
certain period of time. This takes us to the second part of this section—namely to the
diffuse group of cases in which Member States act in a context that is somehow
determined by EU law. The debate on this issue is only in its very infancy.55
One prominent example is the Fransson case, which has already been mentioned
several times. This case concerns the applicability of the EU fundamental right of
“ne bis in idem” (Art. 50 CFR) with regard to national tax and criminal proceedings
that run in parallel and which were based on infringements of the obligation to
declare Value Added Tax. The fact that neither national criminal procedural law nor
the law on tax sanctions implement speciﬁc norms of EU secondary law has been
declared immaterial by the ECJ. According to the Court, it is, rather, sufﬁcient for
the levying of VAT and for the sanctioning of violations of the obligation to declare
taxes to be determined by EU law. In order to establish such a determination, the
ECJ has referred to the principle of loyalty, the obligation to declare taxes provided
for by EU secondary law, and the obligation incumbent on primary law “to impose
effective penalties for conduct prejudicial to the ﬁnancial interests of the European
Union” (Art. 325 TFEU).56 That said, are these links to EU law sufﬁcient to activate
EU fundamental rights? One might even go further and concur with Advocate
General Sharpston in applying EU fundamental rights in all areas of shared com-
petences irrespective of their having been exercised by passing EU legislation. This
would result in a far-reaching obligation of the Member States to apply EU fun-
damental rights.57
Generally speaking, the ECJ still has no clear line here.58 Besides far-reaching
judgments such as the Fransson case just mentioned, there are also restrictive
approaches – for example, the repudiation of an obligation with regard to funda-
mental rights where EU competences have not been exercised (Bartsch case),59 or
55For more details, see Wollenschläger (2014a), paras 29 ff., with further references.
56ECJ, Case C-617/10, Fransson, EU:C:2013:105, paras 17 ff. Approving: Franzius (2015b),
p. 141; Kokott and Sobotta (2015), p. 70 f. Disagreeing: Britz (2015), p. 278.
57ECJ, Case C-34/09, Ruiz Zambrano, [2011] ECR I-1177, opinion of AG Sharpston, paras 163 ff.
58See for an overview of the case-law: Snell (2015), p. 292 ff.
59ECJ, Case C-427/06, Bartsch, [2008] ECR I-7245, para 18.
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where there is only an indirect link to EU policy areas (Annibaldi case).60,61
The BVerfG emphasized in its judgment on the anti-terror database that an indirect
link to EU law is not sufﬁcient to apply EU fundamental rights, and even created a
new barrier to European integration consisting in the preservation of a meaningful
fundamental rights protection scheme at national level.62 The English press release
reads as follows:
The constitutional complaint provides no reasons for a preliminary ruling before the
European Court of Justice. Clearly, the Counter-Terrorism Database Act and actions that
are based on it do not constitute an implementation of Union law according to Art.
51 sec. 1 sentence 1 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. The
Counter-Terrorism Database Act pursues nationally determined objectives which can affect
the functioning of the legal relationships under EU law merely indirectly. Thus, the
European fundamental rights are from the outset not applicable, and the European Court of
Justice is not the lawful judge according to Art. 101 sec. 1 sentence 2 of the Basic Law
… The European Court of Justice’s decision in the case Åkerberg Fransson … does not
change this conclusion. As part of a cooperative relationship, this decision must not be read
in a way that would view it as an apparent ultra vires act or as if it endangered the
60ECJ, Case C-309/96, Annibaldi, [1997] ECR I-7493, paras 13 ff.; further Case C-40/11, Iida,
ECLI:EU:C:2012:691, para 79: “To determine whether the German authorities’ refusal to grant
Mr. Iida a ‘residence card of a family member of a Union citizen’ falls within the implementation
of European Union law within the meaning of Article 51 of the Charter, it must be ascertained
among other things whether the national legislation at issue is intended to implement a provision of
European Union law, what the character of that legislation is, and whether it pursues objectives
other than those covered by European Union law, even if it is capable of indirectly affecting that
law, and also whether there are speciﬁc rules of European Union law on the matter or capable of
affecting it (see Case C 309/96 Annibaldi [1997] ECR I 7493, paragraphs 21 to 23).”
61Cf. further ECJ, Case C-457/09, Chartry, [2011] ECR I-819, paras 23 ff. (intermediate pro-
ceedings); Case C-466/11 Gennaro Currà and Others, EU:C:2012:465, para 25 (compensation in
the context of Second World War); Case C-369/12, Corpul Naţional al Poliţiştilor, EU:
C:2012:725, para 15 (salary reductions in the public sector); Case C-370/12, Pringle, EU:
C:2012:756, paras 179 f. (ESM-Treaty); Case C-128/12, Sindicato dos Bancários, EU:C:2013:149,
paras 11 ff. (salary reductions in the public sector); Case C-73/13, T., EU:C:2013:299, paras 11 ff.
(attorneys’ fees); Case C-282/14, Stylinart, EU:C:2014:2486, paras 18 and 20 (expropriation): “à
cet égard, la Cour a itérativement refusé de reconnaître sa compétence dans une situation où la
décision de renvoi ne contient aucun élément concret permettant de considérer que l’objet de la
procédure au principal concerne l’interprétation ou l’application d’une règle de l’Union autre que
celles ﬁgurant dans la Charte… à cet égard, la question posée par la juridiction de renvoi se borne
à citer des dispositions de la Charte sans invoquer d’autres dispositions du droit de l’Union. Certes,
selon la description faite par la juridiction de renvoi, l’activité économique de la requérante au
principal consiste à assurer des transports internationaux et la livraison de meubles à destination de
magasins de meubles situés en Allemagne. Toutefois, la demande de décision préjudicielle ne
contient aucun élément concret qui aurait conduit celle-ci à s’interroger sur l’interprétation ou
l’application d’une règle de l’Union autre que celles ﬁgurant dans la Charte”; Case C-199/14,
Kárász, EU:C:2014:2243, paras 14 ff. (national pension); Case C-305/14, Băbășan, EU:C:2015:97,
paras 13 ff. (electoral law); Case C-451/14, Petrus, EU:C:2015:71, paras 16 ff. (prescription
acquisitive). Cf. further, von Danwitz (2013), p. 260; Iglesias Sánchez (2012), p. 1588 ff.
62BVerfG, Judgment of 24 April 2013 – 1 BvR 1215/07, BVerfGE (reports) 133, 277, 316;
English translation available at http://www.bverfg.de/e/rs20130424_1bvr121507en.html, accessed
13 January 2017. See also Wollenschläger (2015b), para 103.
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protection and enforcement of the fundamental rights in the member states in a way that
questioned the identity of the Basic Law’s constitutional order. The Senate acts on the
assumption that the statements in the ECJ’s decision are based on the distinctive features of
the law on value-added tax, and express no general view. The Senate’s decision on this
issue was unanimous.63
Where then can we draw the line?64 For the reasons explained in the context of
an obligation with respect to fundamental rights when Member States enjoy dis-
cretion, a restrictive reading seems appropriate.65 Only sufﬁciently speciﬁc
requirements of (primary and secondary) EU law trigger the applicability of EU
fundamental rights.66 This requires a careful analysis of the EU legislation in
question. In view of the variety of possible constellations, a great deal of con-
cretization work still needs to be carried out in the jurisdictional and academic ﬁelds
in order to operationalize this delimitation.67 In any case, competences that have not
yet been exercised certainly do not sufﬁce.68
The ECJ has also recently adopted a more restrictive approach—namely, in its
judgment in the Siragusa case of 6 March 2014, the subject of which was the
question of the applicability of EU fundamental rights to an order issued by an
authority of one of the Member States to remove buildings that had been erected in
breach of landscape protection law.69 No speciﬁc rules of EU law applied to this
situation; the referring Italian court, however, saw a link to EU environmental
policy, albeit the latter was not sufﬁcient for the ECJ. Although it reafﬁrmed its
interpretation as developed in the Fransson case of Art. 51 para. 1 sentence 1 CFR,
according to which EU fundamental rights apply to any national measure falling
within the scope of application of EU law,70 the ECJ, though drawing on previously
developed principles, also stressed the limits of the obligation of the Member States
to respect EU fundamental rights. Thus, “the concept of ‘implementing Union law’,
as referred to in Art. 51 of the Charter, requires a certain degree of connection
above and beyond the matters covered being closely related or one of those matters
having an indirect impact on the other”.71 The important point is whether the
63Press release available at http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/
EN/2013/bvg13-031.html, accessed 13 January 2017.
64Too far-reaching the fusion model of Thym (2015), p. 57 ff.; see further, Franzius (2015b),
p. 151 ff. The challenge lies—with Masing (2015), p. 477; idem (2016), p. 502 ff.; further Britz
(2015), p. 280 f.—in delimitating the different spheres of fundamental rights. Advocating an
extension of the BVerfG’s standard of review to the EU fundamental rights Bäcker (2015), p. 410
ff.
65See Kirchhof (2011), p. 3684 ff.; Ladenburger (2012), p.163 f.; Masing (2016), p. 506 ff.
66von Danwitz (2009), p. 28; further Kokott and Sobotta (2015), p.71 f.; Masing (2016), p. 507 f.
67For a test, cf. Ward (2014), para 51.118. See further, Britz (2015), p. 277 ff.: danger for efﬁcient
implementation of EU law decisive.
68Cf. Ohler (2013), p. 1434; Thym (2013), p. 894.
69ECJ, Case C-206/13, Siragusa, EU:C:2014:126.
70ECJ, Case C-206/13, Siragusa, EU:C:2014:126, paras 21 f.
71Ibid., para 24.
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national legislation in question “is intended to implement a provision of EU law; the
nature of that legislation and whether it pursues objectives other than those covered
by EU law, even if it is capable of indirectly affecting EU law; and also whether
there are speciﬁc rules of EU law on the matter or capable of affecting it”.72 In any
case, EU law needs to impose on Member States an obligation “with regard to the
situation at issue in the main proceedings”.73 Finally, the critical point is whether
the non-application of EU fundamental rights would “undermine the unity, primacy
and effectiveness of EU law”.74 The recent judgments in the Hernández case of 10
July 2014, in the Dano case of 11 November 2014, and in the Nistlahnz Poclava
case of 5 February 2015, follow the same lines.75 However, the ruling on the
applicability of EU fundamental rights to the retention of telecommunication data
handed down on 21 December 2016 stands for a wide understanding.76
3.3 Procedural Implications
Let me conclude by taking a brief look at the procedural implications. Insofar as
obligatory requirements of EU law are implemented, and national fundamental rights
do not therefore apply, the BVerfG has no jurisdiction, as its competence is limited to
applying national constitutional law.77 Matters are different where discretionary
powers of Member States are concerned. Due to the parallel applicability of EU and
national fundamental rights, the BVerfG retains jurisdiction in view of the latter. Even
so, the question will often arise as to how far Member States’ leeway is limited by EU
law, which takes precedence. This presumes a reference to the ECJ, a path which the
BVerfG has not followed so far in the area of fundamental rights (see Sect. 2.2.2).
This presents challenges to legal protection in two respects: First, the obligation to
refer a case to the ECJ not only takes time, but it may also overburden the latter in
view of the great number of cases involving such issues of EU law. Second, indi-
viduals may challenge EU legislation before the ECJ only under very limited con-
ditions [cf. Art. 263 para. 4 TFEU]. As an outlook, it should be mentioned that some
commentators advocate an extension of the BVerfG’s competence to review EU
fundamental rights standards, be it by interpreting national fundamental rights in the
light of EU fundamental rights, or by directly applying EU fundamental rights.78
72Ibid., para 25.
73Ibid., para 26. See also, Ladenburger (2012), p. 167 N. 104; Lenaerts and Gutiérrez-Fons (2014),
paras 55.12 ff.
74ECJ, Case C-206/13, Siragusa, EU:C:2014:126, paras 31 f.
75ECJ, Case C-198/13, Hernández, EU:C:2014:2055, paras 32 ff. Case C-333/13, Dano, EU:
C:2014:2358, paras 87 ff.; Case C-117/14, Nisttahuz Poclava, EU:C:2015:60, paras 27 ff.
76ECJ, Joined Cases C-203/15 and C-698/15, Tele2 Sverige, EU:C:2016:970. Disagreeing,
Wollenschläger and Krönke (2016), p. 906.
77See also N. 46.
78See N. 65.
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As a last procedural implication, let me point to the strengthening of ordinary
courts in relation to the BVerfG, since the former (unlike the BVerfG) have
jurisdiction to apply EU fundamental rights, and thus to set aside national legis-
lation that is in breach of them.79
4 Conclusion
The constitutional limitations on European integration, and more speciﬁcally on the
precedence of EU law, produce an ambivalent result: On the one hand, the prin-
ciples of precedence and of uniform application of EU law are endangered uni-
laterally. However, the contribution of these limitations to improving the protection
of fundamental rights at EU level must not be overlooked, and neither must the
gradual reconciliation of these two perspectives.
With regard to national law, the principles of the precedence and uniform
application of EU law require EU fundamental rights to be applied to national law
determined by EU law. This extends not only to constellations in which secondary
EU law explicitly obliges the Member States to act in a certain way. Rather, even in
cases in which Member States enjoy discretion, the question arises as to the extent
to which EU fundamental rights limit the scope of discretion that is awarded. In this
(limited) sense, the Fransson judgment of the ECJ was right to stress: “Since the
fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter must therefore be complied with
where national legislation falls within the scope of European Union law, situations
cannot exist which are covered in that way by European Union law without those
fundamental rights being applicable. The applicability of European Union law
entails applicability of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter.”80 Or:
“Metaphorically speaking, this means that the Charter is the ‘shadow’ of EU law”.81
The latter reflects the reason (not always sufﬁciently well considered) why
Member States are increasingly bound by EU fundamental rights. This development
results from a growing allocation of competences to the European Union and the
exercise of these competences, notwithstanding expansive approaches in the ECJ’s
jurisprudence and in the literature (a safety net for fundamental rights82). It seems to
me to be important to give this some thought—against the background, for
example, of the current debate about the general regulation on data protection.83
79Cf. Bäcker (2015), p. 400 ff.; Thym (2013), p. 895; further, Kingreen (2013a), p. 808 f.
80ECJ, Case C-617/10, Fransson, EU:C:2013:105, para 21; further Case C-418/11, Texdata, EU:
C:2013:588, para 73.
81Lenaerts and Gutiérrez-Fons (2014), para 55.26.
82von Bogdandy et al. (2012), p. 45. Against: Britz (2015), p. 276.
83See also, Britz (2015), p. 281; Franzius (2015b), p. 144.
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